Judges’ Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Disciplinary Power: The ECtHR Judgment in Savvas v. Greece

The ECtHR ruled in favor of a Greek judge in a case involving disciplinary proceedings for improper conduct on and off duty (Savvas v. Greece). The judge had served extrajudicial notices (ex-officio legal notices) on three senior colleagues via a court bailiff, requesting that they retract negative comments made against him during a promotion procedure. He was subsequently placed on a three-month suspension.

Invoking Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights, A. Savvas argued that he exercised his legal right to express his opinion in the extrajudicial notices, to defend himself against unfounded accusations, to protect his interests in the context of the promotion process, and to safeguard the public interest by ensuring a fair judicial promotion procedure. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR and awarded compensation for pecuniary damage: €5,211.15, non-pecuniary damage: €6,000, and costs and expenses: €1,000.

In its judgment of 8 September 2026 in the case of Savvas v. Greece, the European Court of Human Rights examined a particularly important issue situated at the intersection of freedom of expression, judicial ethics, and the disciplinary liability of judicial officers.

The case concerned a Greek judge who, following an adverse decision regarding his promotion, reacted to critical reports by his colleagues and, as a result of this specific conduct, was subjected to a disciplinary sanction of a three-month temporary suspension.

The ECtHR was called upon to examine whether the imposition of this specific sanction constituted a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression protected under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The applicant, Alexandros Savvas, was a President of the Court of Appeal and had applied for promotion to the Supreme Civil and Criminal Court (Areios Pagos). During his evaluation process before the Supreme Judicial Council of Civil and Criminal Justice, his application was rejected. Although his overall professional performance did not appear to be called into question, comments were made regarding his conduct toward colleagues and court staff, as well as the manner in which he performed his judicial duties. The applicant challenged this decision, and during the proceedings before the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court, negative references regarding his professional conduct and the quality of certain judicial decisions were raised once again.

Following this development, the applicant sent, via a court bailiff, three extrajudicial notices to the judges who had referred to his professional conduct. In these notices, he challenged the accuracy of the statements made against him, characterizing certain allegations as vague, false, and defamatory. At the same time, he expressed his intention to appeal to the competent civil and criminal courts as well as other institutional bodies if the judges in question did not retract their statements. The extrajudicial notices were also communicated to the Minister of Justice.

Disciplinary proceedings were subsequently initiated against the applicant. During the preliminary investigation, testimony was examined regarding an incident in which the applicant had allegedly addressed a court clerk in an intense manner. However, as evidenced by the material in the case file, the witness testimony was not entirely consistent regarding the use of insulting language or the extent of the incident. Nevertheless, the competent disciplinary bodies held that the applicant’s overall conduct constituted improper behavior on and off duty and imposed a three-month temporary suspension. This ruling was upheld on appeal by the competent disciplinary body of the Supreme Court.

Before the ECtHR, the applicant argued that his disciplinary conviction and, in particular, the imposition of the three-month temporary suspension violated his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 10 of the ECHR.

From the outset, the Court recognized that the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed constituted an interference with the exercise of this right. The fact that the applicant was a judge could not exclude him from the protection of Article 10. On the contrary, the ECtHR reiterated the general principle that judicial officers enjoy the protection of freedom of expression, even though their status entails special duties and responsibilities.

The status of a judge undoubtedly requires a heightened duty of restraint, discretion, and care in the use of language. Public confidence in the judiciary and the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judicial branch are legitimate aims that can, under specific conditions, justify restrictions on a judge’s freedom of expression.

However, the fact that a judge is subject to elevated ethical standards does not mean that they are deprived of the right to express views or voice criticism, particularly when that criticism concerns issues linked to their professional standing, evaluation, or the functioning of the justice system.

Of particular importance in the judgment is the distinction between statements of fact and value judgments. The ECtHR recalled that a statement of fact can be subjected to proof of its truth or falsity, whereas a value judgment cannot be subjected to the same process of proof. Value judgments, however, still require a sufficient factual basis. In the present case, the Court held that the characterizations used by the applicant, although intense and critical, fell largely within the realm of value judgments and could not be treated merely as unproven factual assertions. At the same time, it found that there were factual circumstances capable of forming the basis for the applicant’s evaluations.

This element carries special significance for the application of Article 10 of the ECHR. The protection of freedom of expression is not limited to opinions that are favorable, neutral, or acceptable to their recipients. It also extends to expressions that may cause offense, shock, or disturbance, provided that they fall within the protected scope of expression and do not exceed acceptable limits under the specific circumstances. The use of harsh or uncomfortable language is not, in itself, sufficient to render an expression subject to disciplinary punishment.

An important factor in the ECtHR's balancing exercise was also the fact that the statements in question had not been made public to the press or the general public. The extrajudicial notices were addressed directly to the specific judges and were communicated within a limited institutional circle. Therefore, their potential impact on the reputation of the individuals concerned and on public confidence in the judiciary could not be equated to the impact that a public statement via the media or social networks would have had. This dimension aligns with the general principle that the context, manner, recipient, and extent of dissemination of a statement are critical elements when assessing the necessity of a restriction on freedom of expression.

The ECtHR also attached particular weight to the nature of the penalty imposed. The three-month temporary suspension was not a mere symbolic disciplinary reprimand, but a severe sanction with financial and professional consequences for the applicant. The penalty could affect his career status and future professional prospects, while also creating a deterrent effect—a so-called chilling effect—on the exercise of freedom of expression. The ECtHR thus emphasized that when a disciplinary sanction is particularly severe, a correspondingly stricter scrutiny regarding its proportionality and necessity is required.

A decisive factor in the Court’s ruling was the inadequacy of the reasoning provided by the domestic authorities. The ECtHR did not dispute that protecting the authority of the judiciary and the reputation of judicial officers constitutes a legitimate aim. What it examined was whether the domestic bodies carried out the required balancing exercise between that aim and the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. In the Court's view, this balancing exercise was insufficient. The domestic bodies failed to examine in sufficient detail the content of the statements, the context in which they were made, the limited circle of recipients, the existence of a factual basis for the value judgments, the actual harm caused, and, above all, the necessity of imposing such a severe disciplinary penalty.

In doing so, the ECtHR applied the established principle of proportionality governing restrictions under Article 10. It is not enough for a state to show that an interference with freedom of expression pursues a legitimate aim. It must also demonstrate that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and that the specific sanction is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The existence of lighter measures is also an important factor in evaluating proportionality. Especially when dealing with a judicial officer and expression related to their professional standing, disciplinary bodies must examine with particular care whether the imposition of a severe disciplinary sanction is genuinely necessary.

The decision in Savvas v. Greece forms part of the ECtHR's broader line of case law concerning the protection of judges' freedom of expression. Of particular relevance are the cases of Baka v. Hungary, Morice v. France, Guz v. Poland, and Danileţ v. Romania, in which the Court recognized that the freedom of expression of judges is linked not only to their individual rights but also to the proper functioning of justice. A judge is not merely the holder of a personal right to expression, but also a member of an institution that must be able to discuss and address issues regarding the operation of the judicial system. Protecting judicial independence and preserving the freedom of expression of judges are not necessarily conflicting values. Under certain circumstances, the freedom of expression of judges can serve as a safeguard for judicial independence itself.

Savvas v. Greece therefore carries broader significance beyond the specific facts of the case. The judgment underscores that disciplinary authority over judicial officers is not unlimited and that invoking judicial ethics cannot automatically lead to a restriction of freedom of expression. Every disciplinary intervention must be grounded in an individualized assessment of the specific conduct and accompanied by sufficient reasoning as to the necessity and proportionality of the sanction.

The significance of the judgment is also notable regarding the relationship between judicial ethics and rights protected by the ECHR. A judge’s ethical duty to demonstrate restraint cannot be interpreted in a way that deprives the judicial officer of any possibility to challenge or criticize assessments made against them. The required restraint must be balanced against the judge’s right to protect their professional standing and to respond to allegations they consider inaccurate or offensive.

Ultimately, the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR, holding that the domestic authorities failed to strike a fair balance between, on the one hand, the protection of the authority and smooth functioning of the judiciary, and, on the other hand, the protection of the applicant’s freedom of expression. The ruling confirms that even when a judge’s expression is intense, strict, or critical, the imposition of a disciplinary sanction requires a specific examination of all the circumstances—particularly the factual basis of the expression, the context in which it occurred, the degree of publicity, the potential harm caused, and the severity of the sanction imposed.

Savvas v. Greece thus constitutes an important addition to the ECtHR's jurisprudence on the freedom of expression of judicial officers. The core message of the judgment is not that judges enjoy unrestricted speech, but that restrictions on this freedom must be justified with heightened care, especially when the expression concerns matters tied to their professional status, the functioning of justice, or their personal and official evaluation. Disciplinary power must function as a mechanism to protect the dignity and proper operation of justice, rather than as a means to deter legitimate criticism. In this sense, the decision highlights proportionality as the critical bridge connecting judicial ethics with the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Convention.

This case law is also of particular interest to the national judicial systems of Council of Europe member states, serving as a reminder that judicial independence is not only protected against external interference, but is also tied to an internal judicial environment where judges can—within the bounds of ethics and proportionality—express opinions, challenge decisions affecting them, and defend their professional standing without facing disproportionate disciplinary consequences.

The judgement is available here

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